In AFRICACRYPT2010, Abdalla, Chevalier, Manulis, and Pointcheval proposed an improvement of group key exchange (GKE), denoted by GKE+S, which enables on-demand derivation of independent secret subgroup key for all potential subsets. On-demand derivation is efficient (actually, it requires only one round) compared with GKE for subgroup (which requires two or more rounds, usually) by re-using values which was used for the initial GKE session for superior group. In this paper, we improve the Abdalla et al. GKE+S protocol to support key randomization. In our GKE+S protocol, the subgroup key derivation algorithm is probabilistic, whereas it is deterministic in the original Abdalla et al. GKE+S protocol. All subgroup member can compute the new subgroup key (e.g., for countermeasure of subgroup key leakage) with just one-round additional complexity. Our subgroup key establishment methodology is inspired by the "essential idea" of the NAXOS technique. Our GKE+S protocol is authenticated key exchange (AKE) secure under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
INTRODUCTION
In AFRICACRYPT2010 (Abdalla et al., 2010) , Abdalla, Chevalier, Manulis, and Pointcheval proposed an improvement of group key exchange (GKE), denoted by GKE+S 1 , which enables on-demand derivation of independent secret subgroup key for all potential subsets. It is particularly worth noting that the required round of the subgroup key computation phase is just one by re-using the values {y 1 , . . . , y m }. So, the Abdalla et al. GKE+S protocol reduces the round complexity (from two to one) compared with the case that the BD protocol (Burmester and Desmedt, 1994) is directly executed for a subgroup (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U m ). It is notable that their on-demand subgroup key deriva-1 First, the Burmester-Desmedt (BD) protocol (Burmester and Desmedt, 1994 ) (with certain modification to enable the subgroup key derivation) is executed with a group (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n )). In this group key computation phase, a user (say U i ) publishes the value (say y i ) for establishing the group key. The end of this phase, all user (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n ) shares the common group key. Next, in the subgroup key computation phase, a member of subgroup (w.l.o.g., (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U m ) ⊂ (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n )) can establish the subgroup key, which is independent of the group key. tion algorithm is deterministic, that is, the subgroup key is uniquely determined by (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ).
Here, we considered the case that the subgroup (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U m ) would like to establish the "new" subgroup key 2 (e.g., for countermeasure of subgroup key leakage). To establish the new group key, GKE+S protocol for (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n ) needs to be executed again, and then the new subgroup key is established by executing the on-demand derivation algorithm for (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U m ). That is, it spoils the significant achievement of the GKE+S concept.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we improve the Abdalla et al. GKE+S protocol to support key randomization. In our GKE+S protocol, the subgroup key derivation algorithm (say P .SKE) is probabilistic, and therefore all subgroup member can establish the new subgroup key with just one-round additional complexity. Our subgroup key establishment methodology is inspired by the "essential idea" of the NAXOS technique (LaMacchia et al., 2007) 3 (not di-rect use).
The previous one-round GKE schemes (e.g., (Boyd and Nieto, 2003; Gorantla et al., 2009) ) assume that each user U i has a long-lived secret key LL i which is generated in the initial phase, and the initial phase is not included in the round complexity. So, according to the GKE fashion, our GKE+S protocol (of subgroup key phase) also can be regarded as a one-round GKE protocol. One-round GKE has a benefit point from the viewpoint of robustness 4 . If a GKE has two or more rounds, robustness is important, since it is impractical the case that the remaining nodes must run GKE of the first round again. On the contrary, one-round GKE does not have to consider robustness from the protocol termination's point of view. Remark. Note that Cheng and Ma pointed out that the Abdalla et al. GKE+S protocol is vulnerable to malicious insiders attack (Cheng and Ma, 2010) . They also give a countermeasure of such attack by adding the key confirmation phase. However, adding a signature-based key confirmation round is a standard approach (which has been introduced in (Katz and Shin, 2005) ) for insider security. We make it clear that our proposed scheme can be modified to be secure against insider attack by adding the key confirmation phase.
We should notice that a recent paper (Wu et al., 2011) allows to compute group encryption keys for any subgroups without any extra round of communications. This functionally achieves the same goal of this paper. We would like to thank a reviewer who pointed out this fact.
SECURITY MODELS
First, we define the syntax of GKE+S protocol by following (Abdalla et al., 2010) . Let U be a set of at most n users in the universe. We assume that their identities are unique. Any subset of m users
The participation of U i is expressed by an instance Π s i for some s ∈ N (i stands for the identity of U i , and s puted by using the hashed value of the static long-lived secret key and the ephemeral secret key. Even if the ephemeral secret key is revealed, the exponent of the ephemeral public key is not revealed as long as the static long-lived secret key is not revealed. We apply this essential idea of the NAXOS technique.
4 GKE is called robust (Hatano et al., 2011; Jarecki et al., 2007) even if a node is down, the protocol can be successfully terminated by the remaining nodes.
stands for the number of participations of the GKE+S protocol). 
j . Next, we define adversarial models and the authenticated key exchange (AKE) security for both group key and subgroup key. As mentioned by Abdalla et al., the security of GKE+S protocol must ensure independence of the group key and any subgroup key, i.e., both (1) even if any subgroup key is leaked to the adversary, the secrecy of the group key must hold, and (2) the leakage of group key must guarantee the secrecy of any subgroup key. Let A be a PPT adversary who can issue the following queries:
• Execute(U 1 , . . . ,U n ): A can obtain the execution SECRYPT2012-InternationalConferenceonSecurityandCryptography transcript of the group stage between the group member (U 1 , . . . ,U n ).
• Next, we define two freshness notions by following the definitions from (Abdalla et al., 2010) . 
Definition 2 (Instance Freshness
is negligible, where O = {Execute(·), Send(·, ·), 
PROPOSED GKE+S PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose our GKE+S protocol supporting subgroup key randomization. In our proposal, we apply digital signature Σ := (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) for two purposes.
The Underlying Idea. Briefly, the flow of our GKE+S protocol is described as follows.
[ 
, where R i is the random value chosen by U i (and other values are explained in the scheme).
• are revealed, the subgroup key is not revealed, as long as the static long-lived secret key
. . , R m ) can be published, and this is the reason why we achieve the PKE-free setting (whereas, in the Boyd et al. one-round GKE (Boyd and Nieto, 2003) , a random nonce is encrypted by using PKE).
On the contrary of the above discussion, even if the subgroup key is revealed, (z ′ 1,2 , z ′ 2,3 , . . . , z ′ m,1 ) are not revealed since a hash function is modeled as the random oracle. In addition, the validity of R i can be verified by using pk i .
Here, we describe our GKE+S protocol. It is particularly worth noting that no additional computational cost is required, compared with the Abdalla et al. one. We just additionally require that each user U i chooses a random nonce R i . Protocol 1 (Proposed GKE+S Protocol). We assume that each U i ∈ U has the long-lived public and secret key pair (pk i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(1 κ ) (i.e., LL i = sk i ). H : G × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ , H g : G → {0, 1} κ , and H s : G → {0, 1} κ are cryptographic hash functions which are modeled as random oracles.
5 That is, (z ′ 1,2 , z ′ 2,3 , . . . , z ′ m,1 ) are uniquely determined by the subgroup member ssid = (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U m ) and their public values (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ). In the Abdalla et al. GKE+S, the subgroup key is the hashed value of (z ′ 1,2 , z ′ 2,3 , . . . , z ′ m,1 ) and ssid. This is the reason why the subgroup key derivation algorithm of the Abdalla et are not published. So, to realize randomization of keys, our methodology works. As a drawback of our methodology, it totally depends on the random oracle methodology.
The remaining concern is the validity of each R i ,
